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Abstract
Lynn Stout’s paper develops an insightful legal-economic analysis of speculative trading.
From one hand, the paper discusses the legal-economic framework of speculation and its recent
transformation, making reference to the case of derivatives markets crash (and related financial
crisis) of 2007. From another hand, the paper foreshadows a thought-provoking economic model
of trade (and speculation) based on disagreement, advocating further developments that take into
account market manipulation and conflict of interest, whilst relaxing alleged assumptions (and
beliefs) on universal fundamental value and perfect forecasting.
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Lynn Stout’s paper develops an insightful legal-economic analysis of 
speculative trading. Its implications are twofold: for financial regulation and 
economic theory. 
 
1. Implications for financial regulation 
 
From one hand, the paper discusses the legal-economic framework of speculation 
and its transformation between ancient and modern times, taking the case of the 
financial crisis and the derivatives market crash of 2007. The paper fundamentally 
questions the qualitative and quantitative importance of derivatives markets that 
nowadays dominate the creation and circulation of liquidity in the financial 
system. Leading financial intermediaries are now specialised in issuing those 
contracts and making those markets that the author criticises as giant casinos. 
And, as Ace Rothstein said: “In the casino, the cardinal rule is to keep them 
playing and to keep them coming back. The longer they play, the more they lose, 
and in the end, we get it all.”1 
First of all, the traditional common law approach suggests that the 
economic problem of speculation concerns the wrong incentives sent to economic 
actors involved in real investments. Encouraging such gambling would reduce 
society’s capacity to benefit from their efforts at work, because gambling is at 
best a zero-sum occupation in which one gambler’s gains exactly mirrored 
another’s losses. As a result, speculative derivatives bets would “promote no 
legitimate trade” (Melchert v. American Union Telegraph Co., 11 F. 193, 195 (D. 
Iowa 1882)) and “discourage the disposition to engage in steady business or 
labor” (Justh v. Holliday, 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) 346, 349 (1883)).2  
Furthermore, speculative trading introduces a huge conflict of interest 
between investors and the financial intermediary, since the latter can be at the 
same time the issuer and one of the gamblers of the derivative betting game. For 
instance, concerning a recent affair occurred when the U.S. housing market was 
beginning to falter, the SEC alleged on April 16, 2010 that Goldman Sachs 
structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that 
hinged on the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS).3 Accordingly, Goldman Sachs failed to disclose to investors vital 
information about the CDO, in particular the role that a major hedge fund played 
in the portfolio selection process and the fact that the hedge fund had taken a short 
                                                 
1 Voice-over of the leading character in the Martin Scorsese’s film titled « Casino » (1995). 
2 I am in debt to Lynn Stout for these references. 
3 See http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm; 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm; and 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21489.pdf (accessed on Nov 17, 2010). 
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position against the CDO. According to the Wall Street Journal, Goldman Sachs 
“settled the case on July 15, agreeing to pay a $550 million and acknowledging a 
mistake in its handling of the deal.”4 
Lynn Stout criticises the modern drift away from the common sense, 
common law approach to derivatives products and markets. Both modern theories 
and regulations had been increasingly favouring derivatives issuance and trade, 
surely believing in their positive economic consequences. Amid the aftermath of 
the financial crisis of 2007, however, German Authorities decided on May 19, 
2010 to ban naked short selling,5 marking a regulatory step against speculation 
aimed at increasing investors’ protection and improving the functioning of 
securities markets.6 These latter purposes may be achieved by forbidding cash 
settlements, obliging then involved traders to eventually deliver the underlying 
security at term. In contrast, the large majority of the transactions are at the 
present performed by traders who do not have any connection with the underlying 
security and its socio-economic context. 
 
2. Implications for economic theory 
 
From another hand, the author foreshadows a thought-provoking economic model 
of trade (and speculation) based on disagreement. This model suggests (contrary 
to Adam Smith) that not all mutually voluntary exchanges are also mutually 
beneficial, and further carries the unpalatable implications that consenting adults 
do not necessarily make choices that lead to socially optimal outcomes. In this 
context, regulatory design does matter and should be economically efficient, and 
effective for public policy. 
Under conditions of asymmetric and limited knowledge, speculative 
trading can generate pricing distortion – related to market manipulation and moral 
hazard among others –, and diversion of financing (liquidity) from investing to 
speculating. From the theoretical viewpoint, the disagreement-based model of 
speculative trade provides then an understanding of the working of securities 
market that relaxes usual assumptions on universal fundamental value and perfect 
                                                 
4 Cf. Kara Scannell (2010), “Regulator cleared in Goldman Sachs lawsuit,” WSJ, October 15-17, 
2010. 
5 In naked short-selling, a trader sells a security - betting that it will fall - without owning it or 
ensuring that it can be acquired, as would be necessary in a conventional short sale. 
6 See http://www.euractiv.com/en/euro/germany-first-introduce-ban-naked-short-selling-news-
494307 and also http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/merkel-sarkozy-seek-eu-ban-
naked-short-selling-cds-news-495047 (Accessed Nov 17, 2010). 
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forecasting.7 This is in line with the response by Henri Poincaré to Léon Walras 
concerning the early equilibrium model of the market developed by the latter: 
 
… at the beginning of every mathematical investigation, there 
are some hypotheses and, to make that investigation fruitful, 
you must be aware of those hypotheses (…). Forgetting this 
condition means going beyond [what I called] the fair limits 
(…). For example, concerning mechanics, we do often 
disregard friction and consider bodies as perfectly polished. 
You, you look at human beings as unboundedly egoistic and 
unlimitedly farsighted. Whilst the first hypothesis can surely be 
admitted in a first approximation, the second should deserve 
further consideration.8 
 
Accordingly, the merely financial performance generated - for some time - 
by such gambling activity related to speculative trading should be checked out ex 
post against unexpected financial losses for many (contrary to huge financial 
gains for few, especially derivatives issuers and market-makers), and overall 
economic misallocation of resources. 
Modern approaches by economic theory and regulation often assume that 
arbitrageurs can univocally identify mispriced securities and correct market prices 
according to the common knowledge of some universal fundamental value. 
Whenever arbitrageurs recognize positive (negative) misalignments, they start 
buying (selling) on the market, making the market price reversing to that 
overarching fundamental value. This view implies that informed traders can know 
(and agree on) the fundamental value of the underlying security. Lynn Stout’s 
                                                 
7 In the same spirit, cf. Biondi, Yuri and Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo, “Share Price Formation, Market 
Exuberance and Accounting Design.” Banque de France Foundation Research Seminar, November 
23, 2010. URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690398; and Biondi, Yuri, “Money Without Value, 
Accounting Without Measure: How Economic Theory Can Better Fit the Economic and Monetary 
System We Live In.” in: Money and Calculation: Economic and Sociological Perspectives, edited 
by Massimo Amato, Luigi Doria, Luca Fantacci, Chapter 3, London: Palgrave 2010. URL: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1638829 
8 « (…) au début de toute spéculation mathématique il y a des hypothèses et (…), pour [que] cette 
spéculation soit fructueuse, il faut (…) qu’on se rende compte de ces hypothèses. C’est si on 
oubliait cette condition qu’on franchirait les justes limites. Par exemple, en mécanique, on néglige 
souvent le frottement et on regarde les corps comme infiniment polis. Vous, vous regardez les 
hommes comme infiniment égoïstes et infiniment clairvoyants. La première hypothèse peut-être 
dans une première approximation, mis la deuxième nécessiterait peut-être quelques réserves. » In: 
Léon Walras (1909), « Economique et Mécanique » [Economics and Mechanics], Bulletin de la 
Société Vaudoise de Sciences Naturelles, vol. 45, p. 313-325. We draw from the version reprinted 
in 1960, Metroeconomica, 12 (1) – April, p. 3-13 (ed. G.H. Bousquet). The letter by Poincaré was 
published by Walras together with his article. The quote comes from p. 12-13.  
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idea of trading on disagreement intriguingly claims against this assumption (and 
act of faith) on the actual working of securities markets over time. 
Furthermore, modern approaches also assume that market intervention by 
arbitrageurs reallocates economic resources in the fashion that helps offset the 
effects of change of fundamental values. Whenever market prices increase 
(decrease), investors and entrepreneurs revise their investment choices. Real 
economic activities may then receive more (less) resources according to the 
expected fundamental values of those activities. Again, this view assumes (and 
requires) that aggregate forecasting by the market is perfectly right at every period 
of time, whenever choices are made. Otherwise, if the market price is right only 
on average – implying that current price consensus moves up and down around 
the so-called fundamental value in some aleatory way –, it will send biased 
signals to real investments, leading to bullish and bearish mistakes in the 
meanwhile. And this misallocation of resources may be even worst if bubble 
formation (so-called market exuberance, whatever rational or irrational) is taken 
into account.  
Finally, the author invites us to question a financial system based upon 
self-fulfilling prophecies and crystal balls. Following a Greek philosopher, we can 
argue that, first of all, the fundamental value does not exist; later, even if it 
existed, man could not know it; finally, even if he knew it, he never could 
represent and explain it to others.9 Eventually, who can perfectly know the future? 
How the market could know it perfectly, indeed? On this basis, the further 
question is then: what do securities markets do? Unequivocally, they are 
institutional devices that allow trading on shares and other securities in the form 
of financial entitlements which are established by law and formalise expectations 
of and claims to financial rents. They might surely help in aggregating dispersed 
information (by matching heterogeneous opinions and needs), but, remembering 
the Latin adage, ignoramus et ignorabimus (we do not and we will not know), 
they cannot solve the ignorance dimension that characterizes the human 
condition, and favours moral hazard and abuse. 
 
Judicial sources 
 
Justh v. Holliday, 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) 346 (1883) 
Melchert v. American Union Telegraph Co., 11 F. 193 (D. Iowa 1882) 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Fabrice 
Tourre, 10 Civ. 3229 (BJ) (S.D.N.Y. filed April 16, 2010) 
                                                 
9 Gorgias de Léontium, Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Mathem., VII, 65. 
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